We study the diffusion of a capital intensive technology among a fishing community in south India and analyze the dynamics of income inequality during this process. We find that lack of asset wealth is an important predictor of delayed technology adoption. During the diffusion process, inequality follows Kuznets' well-known inverted U-shaped curve. The empirical results imply that redistributive policies favouring the poor result in accelerated economic growth and a shorter duration of sharpened inequality.
The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and training centre and started work in
 Helsinki, Finland in 1985 
Introduction
Globalization has a¤ected the livelihoods of …shing communities in south Asia in several ways over the past half century. In this paper we study one facet of these developments, the adoption of beach-landing …bre reinforced plastic boats (FRP) by …shing households in Tamil Nadu, India. The di¤usion of this new technology, which replaces traditional artisan wooden boats, is as much a product of ongoing globalizing trends as it is a response to distortions caused by previous waves of innovation triggered by globalization.
We shed light on this process by studying both the determinants of technology adoption as well as the resulting income and inequality dynamics over the process of technology di¤usion within a …shing village. The data, which was collected by the authors in 2002 and
2004, cover 65 boat-owning households of a …shing village where the …rst …bre boats appeared in 2001. We …nd, …rst, that poorer households adopt later while ability to operate the new technology does not signi…cantly predict the timing of adoption. Thus inequality and lack of wealth is responsible for a socially ine¢ cient sequence of individual adoptions, whereby the rich and not the most able …shermen adopt …rst. Qualitative interviews with respondents suggest that lack of wealth delays technology adoption mainly through credit constraints and, to a lesser extent, higher risk aversion among poorer households.
Second, we …nd that inequality during the process of technology di¤usion follows Kuznets' well-known inverted U. Initially, the technological innovation widens the gap between the rich and the poor, but after the entire community has completed the technological shift, inequality drops to a lower level than before, which implies that in the long run the innovation studied here bene…ts the poor more than proportionally. We conduct simulations to investigate how di¤erent counterfactual distributions of initial wealth across the sample a¤ect adoption timings. Here we …nd that a redistributive policy favoring the poor results in accelerated economic growth and a shorter duration of sharpened inequality, albeit the quantitative impact of such a policy is small. When we simulate the adoption process for a sample of only rich households, in contrast, the process of adoption is completed ten times as fast as observed in the actual data, implying that rich communities can enjoy the bene…t from technological innovation, and thus grow, considerably 1 faster than poor ones. These …ndings provide a micro illustration of Nissanke and Thorbecke's (2005) point that the relationship between globalization and poverty is complex and may be non-linear.
Among existing studies of technology adoption in low income environments, the context studied here is of particular interest because we focus on a capital intensive technology. In contrast, the bulk of existing literature has focused on divisible, comparatively inexpensive technologies, such as high yield variety seeds, the switch from food to cash crops, or use of chemical fertilizers. As a consequence, the role of wealth and initial inequality among a group of entrepreneurs for the adoption process, as well as the resulting income and inequality dynamics have deserved little attention.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide some background on globalization and India's …shing sector. Section 3 introduces the context of this study and the data. Section 4 reviews relevant existing literature on technology adoption. Section 5 sketches a theoretical framework that illustrates how wealth a¤ects the timing of technology adoption. Section 6 develops the empirical methodology and presents results. In Section 7 we simulate the adoption process for alternative distributions of initial wealth. The …nal section evaluates the …ndings and draws conclusions.
Globalization and South India' s Fishing Sector
To put the present study into the more general perspective of globalization and its impact on the poor, this section sketches important developments in south India's …sheries over the last 40 years with particular reference to the consequences of international development assistance and technology di¤usion.
Until the 1950s the prevailing vessel on the coasts of southern Kerala and Tamil Nadu was the kattumaram, a boat which is manufactured by hand tying together a few logs of wood which are shaped by traditional carpenters. Kattumaram literally means tied-log raft (maram is Tamil for log while kattu means tied). The timber used for kattumarams is albizia, a light weight, fast-growing tropical tree found in forests throughout south India.
Traditionally, kattumarams were equipped with a sail for propulsion. This and subsequent development projects led to a considerable change in the structure of asset ownership and labor relations in …shing communities. While family sized small scale enterprises were the dominant mode previously, productive assets were now concentrated in the hands of a few. Moreover, economies of scale made much of the labor previously employed in the …shing sector redundant and many …shermen became wage laborers on trawlers as the traditional technology was not able to compete with the new one. In consequence, while aggregate production soared, asset and income inequality increased as well (Platteau, 1984; Kurien, 1994) .
The introduction of mechanized vessels, moreover, has depleted the resource base on which small as well as large scale …shing was relying by harvesting shrimp in waters close to the coastline in large quantities. In this connection, it is estimated that Tamil Nadu currently has as much as twice the number of trawlers that could be sustained by the resource base on the long run (Vivekanandan, 2002) . Since the mid 1980's, these developments have increasingly threatened the livelihoods of small-scale …shermen along the coasts of south India. It should be noted in this connection that many places on the coast do not have the option to directly engage in trawler …shing because a trawler requires harbor facilities as, unlike a kattumaram, the vessel is too large to land on a 3 beach.
The depletion of the resource base in waters adjacent to the shore, moreover, increased the pressure on small-scale …shermen to venture into deeper waters. These developments, in turn, created rising demand for engine propulsion in the form of an outboard motor (OBM), which increases the radius of operations of a kattumaram considerably. At this point, globalization enters the picture once more with India's federal government easing the until then heavily protective import policies, which led to a drop in cost of imported, internationally leading brands, such as Yamaha, Suzuki and Evinrude. It thus comes as no surprise that since the mid 1980's small OBMs of eight to nine horse powers have spread rapidly throughout south India's coasts. 1 It became common practice to mount such an engine on a kattumaram, which was previously propelled by sail and manpower only (Kurien, 1994) .
Finally, in the mid 1990's …bre reinforced plastic boats entered the stage. Several factors simultaneously contributed to this development. First, the technological hybrid of kattumaram and OBM proved to be problematic as the vibrations of the engine strain and damage the substance of the vessel (Kurien, 1995) . Second, the material used for FRP production became cheaper relative to the timber used for kattumaram manufacturing. On the one hand, through trade liberalization, …bre materials, which had been in use in the western hemisphere in aerospace, automotive and marine industries since the 1950's, became less costly. On the other hand, albizia became more and more scarce and expensive because of successive deforestation and other demands. Finally, blueprints for appropriate shapes of FRP boats (capable of negotiating high surf and beach landing) became available. In 1995, a boat yard near Pondicherry started out by manufacturing a boat, the so-called Maruthi boat, which resembles a vessel previously developed in Sri Lanka for similar coastal conditions as encountered in southern Tamil Nadu (Kurien, 1995) . Moreover, supported by federal funds, the Tamil Nadu state government sponsored research and development of a new model particularly suited for maritime conditions of India's south-eastern coasts during the 1990's, which went into production in 2000 (Pietersz, 1 In contrast, previous attempts of leading international OBM manufacturers to target India's small scale …shermen in the 1970's were largely unsuccessful (Pietersz, 1993 
The Study Village
The village of study is located in the southern part of the coast of the gulf of Bengal, close to the pilgrim center of Tiruchendur. With a population of 1,500, there were 75 boats operated by 67 households in late 2003. About 250 men worked on these boats, either as owner/captain, family crew or wage laborer. The village has neither a harbor nor a jetty, a fact that restricts operations to beach-landing boats. All year-round operating vessels have a crew of two to four men and are operated by local households. All of these households belong to the exclusively catholic boat-owning community of the village, which used to belong to a speci…c caste before collectively converting about 400 years ago.
On a typical day, boats leave the shore around 1 am and land at the village's market place on the beach between 7 and 11 in the morning. There, local …sh auctioneers market the catches to a group of buyers, which comprise local traders as well as agents of nationwide operating …sh-processing companies.
In our study village, the …rst FRPs were adopted in January Vessel …nancing and marketing of …sh catches are interlinked for almost all boat owning households that we interviewed. Although the focus of the present study is on the adoption of FRPs, it is instructive to start out with the credit cum marketing contract common for kattumarams. For the purchase of a craft, the auctioneer gives a loan of about Rs. 15,000
and 25,000. In return, the boatowner sells all daily catches through that auctioneer, who keeps 5 percent of the value of the sales. The boatowner does not repay the principal.
As a consequence, the commission comprises a compensation for the marketing services as well as an implicit interest payment on the amount owed. When a boatowner switches auctioneers, the new auctioneer settles the debt with the previous one. Switching of auctioneers does occur occasionally. The superiority of this interlinked share arrangement over separate debt and marketing contracts is likely a result of, …rst, limited liability of the …sherman and, second, costless monitoring of the …sherman's day-to-day success by the auctioneer. It is interesting to note that this credit cum marketing arrangement is identical to the one reported by Platteau (1984) in …shing villages in Kerala twenty years earlier.
The contract for FRP …nancing is similar, albeit not identical. The auctioneer advances funds for the purchase of the vessel. However, in addition to a commission of 7 percent, the auctioneer keeps another 10 percent of daily sales, which he deducts from the 6 principal owed by the boatowner. Unlike a kattumaram owner whose level of debt remains constant, an FRP owner asks his auctioneer for additional funds from time to time. When such additional funds are granted, they bare no interest and are added to the …sherman's outstanding balance. The emergence of this feature of debt reduction and repeated renegotiation can be explained by the following two reasons. First, …bre boat …shing consumes more working capital, such as nets. To cover these costs, the owner of an FRP has to incur expenses between Rs. 5,000 and 20,000 from time to time. Second, since the FRP is a new technology, each individual's ability to operate it is not precisely known initially.
Since the auctioneer's cash- ‡ow directly depends on the …sherman's day-to-day success, however, the debt reduction component allows the auctioneer to drive down the debt level of an ex-post unsuccessful …sherman to a level at which the auctioneer's opportunity cost of capital does not exceed his commission income. 2 Many …shermen interviewed stated that the funds extended by the auctioneer initially do not su¢ ce to cover the entire cost of the technology switch. It was, moreover, stated that bank and even money lender credit is virtually unavailable for this purpose as these lending sources do not accept a boat as collateral. Savings were, therefore, mentioned as the second most important source of funds to cover the cost of a …bre boat.
We brie ‡y discuss the structure of labor contracts. On kattumarams, in Platteau's as well as our study village, typically at least two members (two brothers or father and son) of the family which owns the vessel sail on the boat. The rest of the crew consists of laborer-…shermen. To ensure daily availability of non-family labor, boatowners often tie laborers by advancing interest-free credit. On FRP boats, the common remuneration scheme for laborers is based on shares. Speci…cally, from the money which the boatowner receives from the auctioneer (that is net of commission and debt reduction), the expenses For 26 of the 65 households, however, we were able to collect those data and thus have a complete picture of sales before and after (if applicable) adoption as well as household characteristics. This set of households will be referred to as the core sample. Descriptive statistics for those households are set out in Table 1 .
Existing Literature on Technology Adoption in Low Income Countries'Primary Sectors
Much of the literature that studies technology adoption in developing countries concludes that its pace has been rather slow. Feder et al. (1985) , in their excellent review of the early literature point to factors such as credit constraints, aversion to risk and limited access to information, to explain why adoption has not been faster. Most of the work they survey uses static models to explain adoption, while the dynamic properties of adoption are left to heuristic or comparative-static arguments at best. In particular, the role of savings, which may be crucial in contexts where credit or insurance markets are imperfect, especially if the technology is indivisible, does not receive much attention.
The literature distinguishes between divisible technologies, such as high yield varieties (HYV) or new variable inputs, and indivisible technologies, such as tractors or the one we study here, FRP boats. If the technology is divisible, one can study the intensity of adoption of a given farmer as well as the aggregate intensity in a region. When the technology is indivisible, the decision at the individual level is necessarily a dichotomous 3 Two households owned FRPs and hired a crew. In both cases, the household's head primary occupation is not …shing, for which reason we excluded them from the sample. Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) take for granted that HYV of wheat and rice that became available during the Indian Green Revolution in the mid 1960's yield higher pro…ts than traditional varieties. In their model, however, the pro…tability of HYV's is dictated by a target input model, whose optimal level has to be learned. The issue is, again, individual versus social learning in that each "trial" with the new variety generates additional information on the optimal level and this information is conveyed not only to the farmer himself, but also to the entire village (at least to some extent). In contrast to Besley and Case (1994) , however, planting the new crop comes at the cost of choosing an input level that is far from the optimal, especially in earlier periods when there is little knowledge about the optimal level. Farmers …nd themselves playing a dynamic public good game, where each farmer has an incentive to wait because information is generated costlessly by another farmer experimenting with the new crop. As a consequence, those farmers who expect the greatest bene…ts from experimentation adopt …rst. As in Besley and Case (1994), those are the relatively wealthy farmers because they operate several plots, each of which bene…ts from the additional information in future cropping periods.
Interestingly, their results imply that poor farmers in a community of relatively poor farmers adopt earlier than poor farmers with wealthy neighbors.
Bandiera and Rasul (2004) test for non-monotonicity of information spillovers among
Mozambiquean farmers to whom a new sun ‡ower variety was made available in 2000.
They …nd an inverted U-shaped relationship between the amount of available information to a farmer and the probability that he adopts, suggesting that social e¤ects on the To summarize, all of these papers conclude that there is either a positive or no relationship between individual wealth and the decision to adopt a new technology. Wealth, however, is typically correlated with, or even indistinguishable from other important individual characteristics, such as farm size, education, access to credit, availability of other inputs, and access to information. Thus, a positive relationship between wealth and early adoption can be due to alternative factors, which are not disentangled by the existing empirical analysis. Policy recommendations, however, may well depend on the nature of the channel through which wealth a¤ects adoption. In the papers focusing on learning, for example, it is generally argued that poor farmers adopt later because their valuation for information generated by initial "trials" with the new technology is lower. Thus, an infor-mation campaign about the bene…ts would result in more adoption. In general, however, it is not clari…ed, whether alternative channels might also play a role. Other potential candidates are di¤erential risk aversion (see Binswanger et al., 1980) , access to capital, or availability of labor. For example, if the technological innovation is labor intensive and wealthier households have better access to the labor market, a wealthier household may adopt earlier just because of labor market conditions. In the present study, we therefore make an attempt to thoroughly identify the channel through which wealth a¤ects adoption decisions.
Individual Wealth and Technology Adoption: Theory
In this section we sketch a simple model of the propensity to adopt a new, costly technology and the role of initial wealth in this process. Given the discussion in Section 3, we assume that agents only have access to a savings technology to accumulate assets. Agents can produce with a traditional technology (kattumaram) that yields y C or invest in a more pro…table technology (…bre boat) which yields y F in expectation. The …bre boat can be purchased at cost K. Since there is no possibility of borrowing, the investment of K must come from own resources. In line with Section 3 we may think of K as the cost of the boat net of the loan from the auctioneer and of y t as income net of debt repayment and commissions. Agents accumulate assets in the following manner,
where r is the interest rate on savings, a t is the level of assets or liquid wealth in period t, and c t denotes consumption in period t. We assume that agents start in the …rst period with an endowment of assets a 0 .
To keep things simple we assume that agents are risk neutral, live in…nite periods and discount the future at rate . Each period, a household decides whether to purchase the …bre boat and how much to save for the following period. More formally, a household's task is to choose the vector of next period's assets fa t+1 g and the adoption date t to max fa t+1 g;t 1 X t=0 1 1 + r t c t s.t a t+1 = y t c t + (1 + r)a t {ft = t gK; a t+1 0; a 0 given,
where {f g denotes the indicator function.
The program which solves this problem depends on the relative pro…tability of the new versus the old technology. In particular, if
the optimal program involves saving all income until a t K and switching to the new technology in that same time period, which gives t = ln rK+y C ra 0 +y C ln(1 + r) ;
When y F y C + rK, on the other hand, the optimal program involves dissaving instantly, c 0 = y C + a 0 , and consuming all income generated with the old technology concurrently, c t = y t for all t > 0.
By di¤erentiating the optimal adoption time t with respect to the di¤erent parameters of interest, it is easy to see that the higher the initial level of assets a 0 , the higher the income from the kattumaram y C , and the higher the interest rate r, the earlier the adoption time t . In this simple setup, t does not depend on y F other than trough (1).
When utility is concave, however, it can be shown that t is, moreover, decreasing in y F .
Finally, if several …shermen pool their savings, e.g. through a Rosca, adoption can occur earlier on average. It continues to hold, nevertheless, that a group of wealthier individuals can achieve an earlier adoption time on average.
Estimation
In this section, we seek to empirically identify the determinants of the timing of technology adoption. As developed in the previous section, a risk-neutral …sherman seeks to adopt the new technology as quickly as possible when he expects the technology switch to increase his income. An important explanatory variable for the adoption decision is therefore the expected change in income resulting from the technology shift. If expectations are unbiased, the ex-post change in observed income for …sherman i can be interpreted as the (most likely noisy) realization of i's expectations. We therefore …rst estimate the income change of each …sherman who adopted a …bre boat before the interview date and use these results in the subsequent analysis of the timing of adoption.
Estimating the Income Change from Adoption
The goal of this section is to provide estimates of the average income that a …shing household earns with the old and new technology. With the share system that exists in the village for the compensation of both laborers and the capital obtained from an auctioneer, household income is roughly proportional to monthly …sh sales generated by that household. Since both catch quantities as well as daily …sh prices are subject to substantial ‡uctuations, however, the following analysis aims at netting out the individualspeci…c component in how successfully each technology is operated by a given household. 
where y sit denotes monthly sales (in Rupees) of …sherman i in month t who currently operates technology s, where s = C for kattumaram and s = F for a …bre boat. Also consistent with the notation in the previous section, t i denotes the time of adoption by individual i, and i denotes time since adoption, so that t = t i + i . si is an individualspeci…c, technology-dependent …xed e¤ect, while t is a month-speci…c dummy that picks up aggregate …shing conditions and shocks. Finally, u sit is an i.i.d. error term with
This parametrization assumes that shocks a¤ect sales generated through the old and for a later adopter is ‡atter as he starts out with more information in hand than any adopter before him (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995) .
A test of the hypothesis of no learning by doing is thus
Analogously, a test of the hypothesis of no social learning is implemented by testing the composite hypothesis
The results of the estimation of Equation 2 together with F-test statistics for H S and H L are set out in Table 2 . According to these results, the null hypotheses of no social and no individual learning are rejected, at least at the 10% level. According to the point estimates of 1 and 2 , the …rst adopters in the village experience an increase in sales for roughly the …rst ten months with the new technology. 4 The estimate of 1 on the other hand implies that the individual learning curve starts out ‡at for a …sherman who adopts a …bre boat 12 months after the …rst adoption in the village (the absolute value of b 1 equals roughly one twelfth of b 1 ).
We use the insights from the previous estimation for deriving a more restrictive econometric speci…cation, in which there is (positive) individual learning before some cuto¤ date and none of it afterwards. More speci…cally, we estimate log(y sit ) = si + t + {ft t i gD i ( ) + u sit ;
where
Here t 0 denotes the month of the …rst adoption in the village while is a cuto¤ month (counted from the time of the …rst adoption in the village), after which no increase in individual sales occurs. The shape of the D i function can be explained simply: for …sher-men who adopted no later than months after the …rst adoption in the village, D i equals a straight line with slope one before date t 0 + . From t 0 + onwards, it remains at the level attained in that period.
Estimation of (3) by OLS yields a point estimate of = 5, which implies that learning by doing occurs during roughly the …rst half year of using the new technology. 5 This is not surprising given that, in contrast to the duration of an agricultural cultivation cycle, …shing is a daily, and thus a high-frequency activity. 6 The full estimation results for equation 3 are set out in Table 3 . The estimate of is positive and signi…cantly so, suggesting an initial 11% monthly increase in sales for early adopters. The results for the individual-speci…c …xed e¤ects, si , are graphically depicted in Figure 1 for the 25 households for which we have sales data for kattumaram as well as …bre boat …shing.
Each of the 25 data points has abscissa equal to b Ci and ordinate b F i . Notice that, for those …shermen who adopted before t 0 + 5, b 1 D i (5) has been added to b F i . The diagram thus gives the long-run expected gains from technology adoption, which will also be used throughout the rest of this paper. The straight line depicts the 45 line. According to these results, three …shermen su¤ered a loss in sales of more than 1%, 2 experienced virtually no change (less than 1% change), while 20 enjoyed increases in average sales between 3.5 and 158%. The average change equals 40.2% with a standard deviation of 46.8%.
Determinants of the Timing of Technology Adoption
When a technology is divisible, like the adoption of new seeds in agriculture, a farmer with several plots can choose on how many of them to try the new technology. In contrast, a …shing boat is by nature an indivisible productive asset for a household. Moreover, switching technologies is expensive, while with many technologies previousl studied in agricultural contexts, a farmer can reverse the technology switch in subsequent growing cycles without incurring a cost from switching back. To summarize, in the context of 5 Notice that the statistical properties of the point estimate of are non-standard as minimization of the sum of squares over is a discrete problem. Therefore Table 3 only contains the point estimate of . 6 The estimte of can be reconciled with the estimates of equation 2, which suggest that learning by doing lasts for twice as long. Notice that the quadratic function used there is downward sloping for high values of i and thus leads to an upward biased estimate of the duration of learning if the learning curve is in fact ‡at for high values of i .
adoption of new crop varieties in agriculture, the adoption decision is typically both divisible and reversible, while in the present setup, neither of these two properties holds.
Since adoption in the context of this study can be interpreted as a one-time transition from one state, kattumaram …shing, to another state, …bre boat …shing, the timing of the individual adoption decision is most suitably modelled using methods from the statistical analysis of survival data. For the estimation, we adopt the common proportional hazard assumption. According to it, the hazard , that is the probability that i adopts within the next period given that he has not adopted yet, can be factored into a baseline hazard function, which is the same for all individuals in the population, and a function of individual characteristics, x i . Speci…cally, it is assumed that
where is a vector of parameters. An individual with characteristics x i has a hazard higher than the sample average if she is more likely to adopt earlier than the average of the sample because she faces a higher probability of switching at any time t 0 after date zero, conditional on not having switched already before t 0 . The sign of the relationship between an explanatory variable,
x ik say, and the outcome variable t i thus goes the opposite way from an OLS model in which adoption time is regressed on x i : in the proportional hazard model, a positive value of k implies that an individual with a higher value of x ik faces a higher probability of making the transition at any given point in time, and thus reduces the expected value of his adoption time, t i . In the OLS model, in contrast, a positive value of k implies that an individual with a higher value of x ik adopts later in expectation. Another set of key explanatory variables refers to the capital market conditions a household faces. Here we consider two categories, income and asset variables. Within the …rst one, y Ci = exp( Ci ), average sales generated with the old technology, proxies a household's income stream before adoption. If the technology switch requires own funds that are not present when the new technology becomes available, a household with higher y Ci will be able to accumulate the required own funds faster. A signi…cant negative relationship between y Ci and t i can thus be taken as evidence for a credit constraint faced by an income-poor household. Another income variable that will be used is the number of household members who earn an income.
The second one, the value of the house at the time when the new technology became available, is an important component of the assets a household can collateralize to obtain credit. A signi…cant negative relationship between a 0i and t i can thus be taken as evidence for a credit constraint faced by an asset-poor household. Other variables that will be initially included are household size as well as the household head's literacy, age, both linear and squared, and years as boatowner as a measure of experience. Table 4 gives the results of the estimation of the determinants of adoption timing.
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Column 1 gives coe¢ cient estimates together with asymptotic p-values for the full set of regressors, including y i not instrumented. 8 At conventional signi…cance levels, only 7 Notice that Cox's method of partial likelihood does not identify an intercept term. 8 For the three censored observations in the sample used for this estimation we have to impute values of y i . These are obtained by regressing y i of the available 23 uncensored observations for which we have both y Ci and y F i = exp( F i ) on house value, y Ci , age, age squared, literacy and number of crew members who belong to the extended family, and using the estimated coe¢ cients to generate predicted the value of the …sherman's house is a signi…cant determinant of the timing of …bre boat adoption. The positive sign of the coe¢ cient means that a wealthier (in terms of assets)
household is more likely to adopt the new technology earlier. Of the two variables that proxy for the income status of the household, y Ci is signi…cant at the 12% level while the number of family members who earn an income is insigni…cant. The same applies for household size and age. A Wald chi-square test of the hypothesis that both age coe¢ cients are equal to zero fails to reject with a p-value of 0.58.
Column 2 gives coe¢ cient estimates for a speci…cation that uses predicted values of y i , c y i , for the entire sample. As elaborated above, the concern addressed with this methodology is that there are reasons to believe that y i is a noisy realization of the income change expected by an individual. The problem, however, is to …nd good instruments for y i that do not a¤ect the timing of adoption directly. The best one we could …nd in our data is the number of crew members employed by the head of household who belong to the extended family. It is, however, still a rather weak instrument. The only two noticeable changes with this estimation procedure are, …rst, that y Ci is now substantially less signi…cant and, second, that our measure of experience, years as boatowner, becomes more signi…cant. Finally, the Wald chi-square test of the hypothesis that both age coe¢ cients are equal to zero fails to reject with a p-value of 0.92.
Guided by the …ndings of speci…cations 1 and 2 and in regard of the fact that the sample underlying this estimation is small, we also estimate a more parsimoneous version where the four least signi…cant explanatory variables are omitted. According to column 3 of Table 4 , both asset and income poverty signi…cantly delay adoption. Households with a greater realized income gain are likely to adopt earlier, but this relationship is signi…cant only at a level of 0.16. As before, greater experience in kattumaram …shing induces earlier adoption.
Column 4, where the income change is instrumented, con…rms these …ndings. As in the full speci…cation, instrumenting mainly a¤ects the coe¢ cient on y Ci , which ceases to be signi…cant at conventional levels in this speci…cation. To summarize columns 1 through 4, we …nd compelling evidence that asset poverty delays adoption and mixed evidence that values of y i : 20 income poverty does so as well. On the other hand, households that can expect a larger income change from adoption are not more likely to adopt earlier.
The Role of Wealth
We now discuss in some detail how asset wealth a¤ects the timing of adoption. We start by considering the arguments of Besley and Case (1994) and Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) that asset wealth accelerates adoption because land-rich households enjoy higher intertemporal bene…ts from experimentation due to their larger scale of operation. In our sample, in contrast, each household operates exactly one boat before and after the switching of technologies, so that we can safely discard the scale argument.
Another channel we can con…dently rule out is that wealthy households adopt earlier because of better access to the labor market. In the setup studied here, the same amount of labor is employed to operate the old and the new technology. Each household in our sample which adopts the new technology has operated the old technology before and thus already secured the amount of labor needed for the new technology.
What about better access of wealthier households to the new technology? Each household in the sample obtained its FRP from the nearby branch of a domestic FRP manufacturer. That branch is less than 4 kilometers away from the village and no transaction costs for transportation are incurred from the purchase. Moreover, according to villagers, there has never been a supply constraint ever since the new technology has become available in 2000. It can thus be ruled that wealth works through overcoming a supply constraint or having enhanced access to the new technology.
We next examine the relationship between initial wealth and risk-bearing attitudes. It is commonly believed that preferences for risk bearing crucially depend on a household's wealth. In particular, under the plausible assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), households above a certain wealth level choose to incur a given lottery with positive expected payo¤ while households with wealth below that level choose to stay away from it, although they would accumulate assets to later choose the lottery. Apparently, adoption of an FRP entails two forms of risk.
First, the amount of …sh catches ‡uctuates from day to day depending on weather and maritime conditions as well as individual luck. The question, however, is whether these ‡uctuations are more severe with an FRP than with a kattumaram. To obtain an answer, we run the regression log(y sit ) = si + t + u sit separately for s = C and s = F . The resulting root mean squared errors are 0.66 and 0.50, respectively. Thus, controlling for scale by considering the natural logarithm of sales, operating an FRP entails a smaller month-to-month risk than a kattumaram.
While it may be argued that daily catches may exhibit di¤erent volatility patterns across technologies than monthly ones, it is not likely that those are particularly relevant as informal insurance arrangements seem to be prevalent in these villages. In this connection, boatowners report that they can easily obtain a short-term consumption loan from their auctioneer to compensate for a series of bad catches.
Second, as pointed out in the previous subsection, a kattumaram operating boatowner may face uncertainty about the level of average gains (net of day-to-day ‡uctuations) from the technology shift. This together with the DARA assumption can explain later adoption by poorer but ex-post equally successful households. This explanation competes with the remaining one of credit constraints. Since our quantitative data cannot provide a de…nite answer in favor of either one of the two, we will use additional, perceptional data to get a sense of the relative importance of each of the two competing hypotheses.
Our survey asked each boatowner the following question: "Why did you wait (are you waiting) to switch to a FRP boat? Give the most important reason.". By far, the two most frequent answers were, …rst, "It required a lot of capital", and second, "I was uncertain about the bene…ts". Table 5 gives some statistics relating to the characteristics of the respondents by their answer to this question. The pattern we …nd is as follows. First, the capital requirement is mentioned roughly 50% more often than bene…t uncertainty.
Second, wealth among those who cite bene…t uncertainty as the main reason is on average more than 25% higher than among those who mention the capital requirement …rst. This suggests that the capital constraint is more severe for poorer entrepreneurs, in fact to such an extent that it dominates the concern about bene…t uncertainty, even though that latter concern is also of greater importance to poorer decision makers when DARA is 22 postulated. While the di¤erence in asset wealth across answers is on the order of 30%, this di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant. In that light, we do not have statistically signi…cant, albeit economically important, evidence for the assertion that a lack of wealth a¤ects the timing of adoption mainly through limited access to capital.
Simulation
The …ndings of the estimation suggest that asset poverty delays technology adoption. To be more precise, among two households which expect the same increase in average income from adoption, the wealthier one is more likely to adopt …rst. In this section, we address the policy-relevant question of how alternative distributions of wealth, as measured by house value, change the pattern of technology di¤usion. We focus on the relationship between the wealth distribution, which will be a¤ected by the di¤erent economic policies considered, and the outcome variables mean income (within the sample) and income inequality.
To conduct simulations, we …rst need to specify a baseline hazard function, 0 (t). We make the assumption of a constant baseline hazard,
given the small sample we have. Moreover, we consider a situation in which each household adopts exactly at the expected value of its adoption time,
which is of course a function of b . With a constant baseline hazard, we obtain
Finally, the parameter is calibrated as follows. In our sample, three households have not adopted before the interview date. We thus choose such that the date of the last adoption recorded before the date of the interview matches the fourth to last adoption date in the data simulated with the actual values of x i . Figure 3 plots actual and simulated mean income. Notice that actual mean income uses all y si for …xed t, that is y F i (y Ci ) enters the average when household i has (not) adopted before date t. More formally, actual mean income is computed as
The formula for predicted mean income is given by the same expression, except that t i is replaced by b t i . The predicted data is generated from the speci…cation of Column 3 in Table 4 . Without reproducing the results separately, we note that the shape of the predicted graph remains qualitatively unchanged when the instrumented version, Column 4 in Table 4 , is used instead.
According to the solid line in Figure 3 , there are three obvious "waves" of adoption:
at the beginning, then just before one year later, and …nally a little more than two years later. Notice that the solid line ends at the 36th month, the last date for which we have data.
Our simulation model appears to capture satisfactorily the main features of the data, though the predicted path is smoother than the stair-shaped pattern in the actual data. According to the simulation, the last household in the sample adopts 54 months after the technology has become available. At that time, predicted average income has increased by about 39%. We now turn to the simulated policy counterfactuals. We …rst investigate the consequences of redistributive policies. Toward this, we assume that each household in the sample holds just the mean level of wealth observed in the data, i.e. owns a house worth Rs. 75,380. In such a scenario, the credit constraint is loosened for households whose wealth is below average and tightened for the rest. If the relationship between wealth that can be collateralized and the extent to which a household is credit-constrained is concave, we expect adoption to occur more promptly on average with such a policy in place. The results for mean income and the Gini are plotted in Figures 5 and 6 , respectively. According to Figure 5 , equal redistribution does in fact result in a quicker adoption process.
According to the simulation, the last adoption occurs a year earlier, in the 42nd instead of the 54th month, than with the actual wealth distribution. The e¤ect on sales over the course of the adoption process, on the other hand, is rather small. With an equal asset distribution, simulated sales never exceed predicted actual ones by more than 7 percent.
Moreover, when we focus on di¤erences between simulated and predicted actual sales of more than 3%, simulated sales never lead predicted actual ones by more than …ve months.
According to Figure 6 , a similar picture emerges for the dynamics of inequality. While the inverted U contracts by about 20% toward the origin, the change in the general pattern of inequality as measured by the Gini can hardly be judged economically signi…cant.
A second set of simulations investigates two extreme scenarios. The …rst one assumes that each household in the sample holds only the smallest observed wealth, that is each house is assumed to be worth Rs. 20,000. The second one, in contrast, assumes that each household in the sample holds the highest observed wealth, that is each house is assumed to be worth Rs. 500,000. The results for this set of simulations together with the predicted actual values are set out in Figures 7 and 8 . We thus consider situations in which all households are either tightly credit-constrained or virtually do not face a credit constraint at all. The mean income and inequality paths for the …rst simulation very closely follow the respective paths generated from the actual asset data, which suggests that the observed income pattern accompanying the introduction of the new technology closely resembles a situation in which all households are substantially credit-constrained.
The results for the second simulation, where the credit constraint is released for the entire sample, are more striking. The dotted lines in Figures 7 and 8 suggest that with a uniformly high level of asset wealth the adoption process is completed in just …ve months.
As a consequence, the village enjoys a substantially higher mean income for about two years by which adoptions in the simulated data lead predicted actual ones. This result suggests that a community in which households face virtually no credit constraints is able to move up the technology ladder much faster than the one investigated by this study.
Similarly, only a minor spike remains of the observed pronounced inverted U shape of inequality.
Conclusions
This paper studies the di¤usion of a new technology among south Indian …shermen, which is as much a product of ongoing globalizing trends as it is a response to distortions caused by previous waves of innovation triggered by globalization. We identify determinants of the timing of technology adoption as well as resulting income and inequality dynamics during this process. We …nd that lack of wealth is a key predictor for delayed adoption and that the channel through which this mechanism is e¤ective is a credit constraint. During the di¤usion process, inequality follows Kuznets' well-known inverted U-shaped curve.
Simulations suggest that a redistributive policy favoring the poor results in accelerated economic growth and a shorter duration of sharpened inequality, although the quantitative impact of such a policy is small.
One advantage of this paper over other studies is that context is well understood. Thus, the speci…c channels in which wealth matters for adoption, credit constraints as well as higher risk aversion, are identi…ed. We conclude, like Platteau (1984) , that overall our study village experienced a success story of globalization. According to our simulations, technology di¤usion for the entire sample is completed in less than …ve years and income gains for the initially poor are relatively larger than for the rich.
What remains unaddressed by this research are the long-run consequences for the resource base and thus future generations of …shermen due to increased e¢ ciency in …shing. Future work will have to evaluate whether the short-term gains generated by the di¤usion of …bre reinforced plastic boats are both economically and environmentally sustainable. Previous instances of globalization and subsequent resource depletion in low income countries warrant scepticism. * equals one if he reports that he can read or write, and zero otherwise. ** for those households that had adopted before the interview, which took place in the 62 nd month. 
